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Abstract
This paper analyses the behaviour, inuence and role of third par-
ties in tradable permits markets. Following the literature, it focuses
on a framework in order to understand how society and third par-
ties react against the rmsemissions due to their participation in the
tradable permitsmarket. Therefore the paper reveals the tradable
permits mechanism as a new way for public direct action and high-
lights the possible benets for the regulator. An important part of
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the third parties consists of the very active participation of the En-
vironmental Non Governmental Organisations. Therefore, this paper
argues that the third partys participation and specically the environ-
mental groupsparticipation in tradable permitsmarket could drive
the market to the optimum equilibrium. In order to examine this
propositionwe use some data from the rst phase of the permits
market in European Union and some available data for the environ-
mental groupsincome. We conclude that the environmental groups
could purchase the exceeded, overallocated permits and could drive
the market in the equilibrium point. Finally, for the regulator the en-
vironmental groupsparticipation could be desirable given that they
could improve the e¢ ciency of the tradable permits market.
Keywords: emissions; permits; overallocation; third parties; envi-
ronmental groups; equilibrium.
JEL Codes: L31 Q50 Q32 Q54,
1 Introduction
In the last few years, an increasing number of studies in economic literature
report and analyse the third partiesparticipation in tradable permits mar-
ket. The common spirit in these studies is the role that the third parties
could play in the market as well as the information-signal which they may
give to the regulator. The third parties could participate in the Emissions
Trading Systems (ETS) like in the European permitsmarket and could pur-
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chase or sell permits as an extra player (except the rms) in the permits
trading process. Therefore, this could be a signal for the regulator that the
number of the permits in the permitsmarket (allocated by the regulator)
is more than the optimum level. Hence, the third parties could participate
and purchase the extra quantity of permits which exceed the optimum point
where their participation could drive the market to the equilibrium level or
at least closer to this.
The aim of our study is to conrm practically if the third partiespar-
ticipation in the ETS is strong enough to drive the market to the optimum
point in which the real level of emissions are equal to the number of permits
excluding the permits that have been withdrawn by the third parties. For
this reason we focus on a specic part of the third parties, the environmental
groups because they have a strong participation in the permitsmarket and
they focus on the retirement of the permits as a tool in order to press the
rms to adopt a better less polluting technology.
The rest of the paper is divided in two parts. In the rst part we analyse
the function and the origins of the European ETS. Also, we present the liter-
ature with respect to the third partiesparticipation in the tradable permits
market and specically the environmental groups participation and their
relation with the permits. In the second part we examine if the environmen-
tal groupsparticipation could drive the market to an interior equilibrium
given that initially the regulator allocated number of permits more than the
optimum. For this reason we use some empirical evidence and specically
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we focus on the rst phase of the tradable permitsapplication in European
Union (2005-2007). Furthermore, we collected the data for the environmen-
tal groupsincome for the same period and following the permitsprices of
this period we examine if the ENGOs had the purchasing power to buy and
withdraw part of the extra-overallocated permits.
Our results indicate that it is possible for the environmentalists, due to
their participation in the ETS, to drive the market to the interior equilibrium
point. Simply, the environmental groups had the aggregate su¢ cient budget
to purchase and withdraw, out of the market, the surplus quantity of permits
(the excess over the optimum quantity of permits). Finally, for the regulator
the third partiesparticipation could be an important helpor a safety valve
(maybe partial) which could protect the market if he will allocate a number
of permits greater than the optimum.
1.1 European Union Emissions Trading System - Ori-
gins and Applications
The function and the use of European Unions Emission Trading System (EU
ETS hereafter) were reinforced by the Kyoto Protocol (1998) and the e¤orts
by many countries to stop global warming. These countries participated in
the Conference of the Parties (COP) in order to decide on the strategies and
tools against global warming. In 1997 the COP3 took place in Kyoto and its
result was the Kyoto Protocol where the Parties decided to reduce the level
4
of the greenhouse gases by 5% below the level of the analogous emissions
from the year 1990. The time line for this target is the period 2008 until
2012.
The European Union (15 members-countries) was a leader at the meetings
of COP and ratied the Kyoto Protocol. For the EU the target for emissions
reduction is equal to 8% below the 1990s level of emissions. Therefore,
the EU adopted the Kyoto Protocol and the mechanisms for the control and
the reduction of the total emissions.1 One main instrument introduced in the
Protocol was the tradable permits system. For the EU, the emissions trading
system became the cornerstone of its environmental policy especially for the
reduction of the CO2 emissions (Convery, 2009). The rst application of the
EU ETS took place in 2005 where 11,500 rms (mainly heavy or energy-
intensive industries) participated in the new tool, making the EU ETS the
largest application of tradable permits in the world (e.g. Convery, 2009
and Newbery, 2008). According to the emissions trading system each unit of
emission released to the atmosphere from a rm has to be accompanied by the
analogous allowance or the emission permit from the specic rm, for example
1The mechanisms introduced in the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of the greenhouse
gases (GHG) are; The Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and the Emission Trading (E.T.). The J.I. allows one industrialized country to
reduce part of its emissions by investing in the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG)
in another industrialized country. Both countries should belong to the Annex I parties
according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
In the Annex I belong these industrialized countries which have quantied targets for
the reduction of GHG. Furthermore CDM allows an Annex I country to reduce part of
itsemissions by investing or run projects for the reduction of the GHG emissions in a
non-Annex I country. Non-Annex I countries are the developing countries without any
specied, quantied target for the reduction of the GHG emissions.
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one tonne of CO2 equals one permit. However the permits are allocated by
the government (regulator) in each country to which the rms belong. Hence
the total number of permits represents the maximum permissible levels of
total emissions. Moreover, the number of the permits which corresponded to
each member-state of the European Union had been decided in 1998. Simply,
for each Member the target for the emissions reduction was di¤erent and all
the targets together are equal to 8% less than the emissions of 1990 for the
specic countries. This decision is known as the burden sharing agreement
and according to this agreement specic numbers of permits belong to each
Member State.2
Concretely, following the European environmental decisions, each member-
state of the European community has a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for
the allocation of the emissions permits to each industrial sector and rms in
the country. Therefore, the regulator (government) will allocate the permits
to the rms in accordance with each plan. Furthermore, in the context of
the NAPs, the regulator will follow the grandfathered distribution system
in order to share the permits to the rms. In the grandfathered system the
regulator will allocate, free of charge, a specic number of permits to the
rms according to the industrieshistorical emissions. These permits are the
initial permits for each rm. Therefore the total number of the permits in
the European market could not exceed the specic level of emissions.3 Con-
2See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/932
3According to the directive 2003/87/EC the European Union has specic target for the
reduction of the emissions in the EU area. For the period 2008-2012 the target is equal to
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very, (2009) briey describes all the pieces of the puzzle (meetings, decision,
legislations documents and conferences) from the beginning until the rst
application of the EU ETS.
According to the baseline of the tradable permits, the rms with the initial
permits -allocated by the regulator- can participate in the transactions of the
permits in the analogous market. If a rm has more permits than emissions
for a specic period, then the rm can sell the excess permits through the
permitsmarket to other rm(s) with more emissions than permits. A rm
could purchase extra permits via the permitsmarket if it has more emissions
than permits or could adopt a less polluting technology or/ and may reduce
the level of the output. Finally, the regulator in the end of the specic period
(e.g. 2008-2012) will enforce a penalty to this rm which has more emissions
than permits. Hence, a market for permits could induce rms to nd a
socially desirable outcome and emissions with the governments intervention.
1.2 Theoretical background
The idea of the tradable permits market is familiar in economic science since
it has been introduced by Coase (1960) as a possible instrument for the bi-
lateral negotiations between the polluter and the polluting. Thus, the use
of the permits bring about an equilibrium level of emissions acceptable to
both sides. Later, Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) built on the Coasian idea
8% below the amount of emissions from the year 1990. Therefore the total number of the
permits that had been allocated by the regulator to the rms for the period 2008-2012 is
equal to the targets emissions.
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to illustrate the xed quantity of transferable permits as a new instrument
for environmental policy. The level of the xed permits represents the total
allowable pollution and the price of the permits could be a motivation for
the polluters to innovate and reduce emissions. Specically, Crocker focuses
mainly on the air pollution in United States and Dales, Canada on water
pollution. However, when the idea of the tradable permits became more
mature, more studies focused on the design of markets for transferable per-
mits: Montgomery, (1972); Mackintosh, (1973); Kneese and Schultze, (1975);
Krupnick et al, (1983) and Baumol and Oates, (1988). In these studies the
authors showed that the system of tradable permits could reach their en-
vironmental targets with minimum cost. The function and the idea of the
tradable permits market was well described by Pearce (2002, pp. 74-75.)
"Given the need to meet some target, say X tonnes of pollution, and the
source of the pollution is Y emitters, distribute permits equal to X tonnes
to the emitters, and then allow them to buy and sell the permits. Because
pollution without a permit is not allowed, each emitter will reduce pollution
so long as the cost of doing so is less than the price that would have to be
paid for a permit. High abatementcost polluters will therefore tend to buy
permits, and lowcost polluters will sell permits. The market in permits will
determine an equilibrium price for the permits."
Then, the idea passed from theory to the real market in USA for the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 under the authority of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for air quality. In the same spirit, the tradable
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permits applied for shing quotas, airport landing slots, development rights
for land use, etc. (e.g. Gorman and Solomon, 2002; Pearce, 2002 and Heyes
and Liston, 2006). For a brief early application of emissions trading systems
see Gorman and Solomon, (2002).
1.3 Who can participate in the EU ETS?
The European tradable permits market is open to all the possible players or
agents in the market. According to the European legislation documents and
o¢ cial statutory documents, everyone can participate in the European ETS.
Therefore, the European Commissions law decisions allowed the participa-
tion in the ETS not only to those who create the pollution but also to the
victims who su¤er from this. That is, the third parties like, the victims from
the rmsemissions, Non Governmental Organisations (e.g. environmental
groups), legal persons, citizens, consumers, individuals, schools, unions, asso-
ciations, etc. can participate in the permits market in order to: a) purchase
permits from the market; b) to sell permits to the market or; c) to purchase
and withdraw permits from the market.
A number of important documents conrm the third parties free en-
trance and participation in the emissions trading system. For example; the
instruction COM (2001) 581 Final proposal, allows ecological groups (Non
Government Organizations) to buy and withdraw permits from the market.
(Page 12; Paragraph 13, Distribution and Publication of Permits.).4 Also,
4E.C. COM (2001) 581 nal Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and
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another report about the participation by legal persons in permitsmar-
ket originates from the UNFCCC Guideline (FCCC/CP/2001/2/Add.4.).5
Moreover, in the Directive 2003/87/E.C. it is clear that any legal or natural
person can participate in emission trading market.6
2 Third partiesparticipation in the ETS
Theoretical papers have focused on the third partiesparticipation in rela-
tion to the regulators decisions problem (the endowment of permits) and the
systems e¢ ciency. The economic approach is based on a common political-
economic-social platform which links the economistsopinion. Specically,
the economic consensus that an optimal pollution control is possible if the
pollutions damage and the abatement cost of pollution are known to every-
body. Because in the real world it is not possible for the government or
the regulator to know these two parameters several di¤erent theoretical ap-
proaches have been designed, by the researchers, in order to test the tradable
permitse¢ ciency under the third partiesparticipation. In this case if the
of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within
the community and amending council directive 96/61/EC.
5FCCC/CP/2001/2/Addition 4. Page 27, paragraph 21 (b)). Review of the imple-
mentation of commitments and of other provisions of the convention. Preparations for the
rst session of the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the
Kyoto protocol (decision 8/cp.4). Decisions concerning guidelines under articles 5, 7 and
8 of the Kyoto protocol.
6Directive 2003/87/E.C. article 3, paragraph (g) Directive 2003/87/E.C. of the Eu-
ropean parliament and of the council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for green-
house gas emission allowance trading within the community and amending council directive
96/61/E.C.
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third parties are dissatised with the quantity of emissions then in order to
react against pollution will participate in the permitssystem. Hence, they
could purchase and retire permits. These theoretical papers are analyzed
below.
In Smith and Yates (2003a) rms and citizens purchase permits. The
authors analyzed the case in which the regulator faces uncertainty about
environmental damages and about the citizensparticipation and their col-
lective action problem. They examine this case in a static and a dynamic
model and they present the optimal permits endowments for both cases.
Also, Smith and Yates (2003b) show that consumersparticipation in the
permits market may create a signal for the regulator. If consumers purchase
permits then, the initial number of permits (allocated by the regulator) is
too high and the market equilibrium is ine¢ cient. The regulator can read
this signal and can improve the social welfare in the future.
In an analogous spirit, Shrestha (1998) argues that in the case where the
regulator has uncertainty about the benets or the damage; the environmen-
tal groupsand/or the citizens(victims) participation in ETS can drive the
market into the interior equilibrium point. However, there are two condi-
tions: First ecologists or citizens are allowed to participate in ETS. Second
the marginal benets of ecologists/citizen exceed the price of permits which
is equal to the marginal cost of pollution control.
Malueg and Yates (2006) present two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst
scenario, the citizens lobby the government to reduce the pollution permit
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endowment (in opposition to the rmslobby). In the second scenario, the
citizens participate directly in the ETS with the aim of purchasing and re-
tiring permits. In their basic scenario permits are auctioned rather than
grandfathered. They conclude that rms and citizens prefer permits.
Boyd and Conley (1997) and Conley and Smith (2005) consider a market
in which the citizens participate in the permits market. However the retired
permits are not sold at the same prices as in the common market but at
personalized price.
Ahlheim and Schneider (2002) propose a system where the households
can distribute the permits. They support a new sharing system for the
permits allocation. According to this, the permits are distributed rstly
to households free of charge by the regulator and then the households sell
as many permits as they wish, to rms. Then, this new system includes
householdspreferences. Hence, this kind of participation is not parallel with
the rmsaction in the permit market and the permits are not shared by
grandfathered system.
Recently, English and Yates (2007) designed an expansion on the Kwerel
(1977) mechanism adding the citizensdemand for permits. In their conclu-
sions, the Kwerel mechanism is e¤ective when the citizens are participating
only if, there is absence of elements of stature environmental damage (the
level of the damage is unknown).7
7The pollutions damage is common knowledge but the rms abatement cost is private.
The regulator asks the rms about their abatement cost. By Kwerels assumptions the
rms have higher benet telling the truth. The government (regulator) does not grandfa-
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Furthermore, a recent paper in a similar spirit emanates from Rousse
(2008). This paper di¤uses the idea of the citizensparticipation in the ETS
in order to purchase and withdraw permits which induces emissionsreduc-
tion and distinguishes the advantages of the direct participation in the ETS
in relation to the carbon-o¤sets. A public institution or a non-governmental
organization could be the broker which can perform the citizenspurchase
but then the possible high increase in the permits price -which emanates
from the citizensparticipation- could stimulate innovation.
Finally, Eshel and Sexton (2009), argue that the direct participation of
the community in the permitsmarket may contribute to the environmen-
tal quality and reveal the communitys preferences for the level of pollution.
In their model, the community participates in an imperfectly competitive
permitsmarket under the presence of one dominant rm which can a¤ect
the price of the permits (market power) but it is a price taker in the out-
put market. Also they assume that the rest of the rms are price takers to
both markets, permits and output, where the community is a price taker in
the permitsmarket. Furthermore, they analyse two cases; In the rst case
the community can purchase permits only through the permitsmarket. In
the second case, the regulator will allocate initial permits (free of charge -
grandfathered system) to the rms as well as to the community. Thus, the
community can purchase and /or can sell permits to the rms through to the
permitsmarket. The authors conclude that the participation of the commu-
ther the permits.
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nity in the permitsmarket could have an ambiguous inuence (increasing
or decreasing) on the e¢ ciency of the tradable permitssystem and it de-
pends on the position of the dominant rm in the permitsmarket. Simply,
it depends if the dominant rm is a net seller or a net buyer of permits.
3 Environmental groupsstrategy and trad-
able permits
As we know from the legal documents, everyone can participate in the ETS,
even the victims. The victims could be some interests groups or individ-
ual persons who are a¤ected by the rmsemissions and are trying to react
against the pollution. We will focus on a specic interest group with high
sensitivity to environmental protection; the environmental groups. Charac-
teristic of the environmental groups are, the methods which they use in their
strategy: activism and lobbying.8 From the late 80s decade, environmental
groups had participated in the USAs permits market in order to withdraw
a number of allowances from the market as a way to reduce pollution. Then
the environmental groupsacquired another new method for environmental
protection. This new strategy is clear from the homepage of Acid Rain Re-
tirement Fund (ARRF, 1997) :9
8For an idea on the transnational environmental activist groups in the international
politic arena, with examples on activism, see Wapner (1995).
9The ARRF is one of the leading environmental groups in USA. The source of this
information emanates from Carman (2002).
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«As we retire more allowances, the price will go up. Polluting companies
will need to bid larger amounts of money to continue polluting. As the price
of polluting goes up, companies will be more inclined to invest money in
technologies that remove pollution before it reaches the smokestack»
Permits in the environmentalistshands confer the right not to accept
more pollution emissions from rms and a democratic reaction like this is
possible only by the victimsfree participation in the permitsmarket with-
out restrictions. This opinion is conrmed by Kruger and Dean (1997) who
argue that the environmentalists participation in the ETS by an ethics
viewpoint lends a democratic character to the permitssystem. Hence the
environmental groups independent of the type of distribution system (auc-
tioned or grandfathered) selected by the government, could purchase and
withdraw permits (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002). Gorman and Solomon
(2002) and Hahn and Stavins (1991) describe the environmentalistsreaction
to the emissions tradable permitsapplication in USA. They argue that the
ecologists had been opposed to the early applications of EPA emissions trad-
ing program (in 70s and 80s) but later become major proponents of tradable
permits since the control of acid rain (later 80s).10 In addition, Tietenberg
(1990) points out that some environmental groups (organizations) have eco-
nomic incentive approaches in their strategy for environmental protection.
Initially, the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS took place in
USA almost from the rst applications of the tradable permits. Currently
10EPA: Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.A.
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the British Non Governmental Organisation, Sandbag, collects charitable
donations in order to purchase and withdrawn permits from the European
Emission Trading System. From the historic applications of the tradable
permits in USA we have some elements which could explain; the environ-
mentaliststargets or the reasons for this participation as well as their e¤ects
in the permitssystem and market. These elements are presented later in the
paper but rstly we explain why the environmentalists prefer the tradable
permits as a better way (than other choices) in order to achieve their aims.
3.1 Why the environmentalists prefer the tradable per-
mits?
The environmentalists prefer the permits market to the taxes because the
level of desirable emissions reduction is explicit (Stavins 1998) and the level
of the environmental protection that will be achieved is specied (Hahn and
Stavins, 1991). Moreover, according to Carman (2002), the free participation
in the tradable permits markets could directly a¤ect the policy outcomes and
create a new way of public activism and reaction for groups which care for
the environmental quality. Furthermore, the success of the interest groups
lobbying is more uncertain in relation to the tradable permits. In a further
analysis on the interest groups preferences on tradable permits, Svendsen
(1999) ascertains that, from the environmentalistsviewpoint, the free per-
mitssharing based on the historical emissions (grandfathered), makes the de-
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crease of high level emissions from the industry more possible. Moreover, the
environmentalists trust the grandfathered system because it provides higher
degrees of insurance against the cases of rms cheating. The grandfather
system is an automatic monitoring system. The regulator or an authority
is monitoring the rms emissions and enforces a penalty if in the end of a
specic period the rm has more emissions than permits.
3.2 Environmentalists participation in tradable per-
mitsmarket
From the earlier applications on tradable permits in USA, we have some
reports about the environmentalistsparticipation in the ETS. The ecological
groupsparticipation started in the US almost two decades before. Some
examples are: Clean Air Conservancy Trust, Acid Rain Retirement Fund,
Adirondack Council and Environmental Resources Trust.11 These groups use
donated funds to purchase and withdraw emissions permits in order to reduce
the level of the maximum emissions in the atmosphere. In the literature, some
empirical papers conrm and analyze the third partiesparticipation in the
USs tradable permits markets.
Israel D. (2007) examines the thirds partiesparticipation (but mainly
the environmental groups) in the sulfur emissions trading program between
the years 1993 and 2006. She concludes that the number of the withdrawn
11For more information: http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/traiding/buying.html (access
date 27 Nov. 2007).
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permits is not too high relatively to the total number of available permits in
the market. This fact indicates that, on the one hand the regulator had un-
certainty about the social optimal level of emissions but, on the other hand,
the regulator had targets near to the social optimal. Joskow et al. (1998),
through an empirical analysis on the auction of tradable emissions (SO2) in
90s, had focused on the buyersbehaviours and they argued that; the third
parties (ecological groups, law schools, etc) used to o¤er very high prices for
the permits acquisition. The possible explanations for this behavior, accord-
ing to the authors are: a) the non awareness about the markets function;
b) the certainty of the permits property or; c) the buyers appreciated that
it was plausible for some reason to o¤er high prices. Schwarze and Zapfel
(2000) compared the design of two di¤erent anti-pollution programs (SAT
and RECLAIM) in which the third partiesparticipation in permits market
conrmed the political acceptability and the public correspondence for envi-
ronmental improvement.12 Frank (2001) presents the di¢ culties of the trad-
able permitsapplication but also comments on the systems benets where
he includes the permitsownership by the environmental organizations. Ti-
etenberg (2003) in the experience of the tradable permitsapplication in air,
water and sheries, concludes that the environmental groups had purchased
and withdrawn allowances in acid rain permits market.
The environmentalists have one main aim: They want to minimize the
12Sulfur Allowance Trading Program (SAT) for the decreasing of SO2 and South Cali-
fornian Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) for the decreasing of SOX and
NOX .
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rmsexternalities. So the environmentalists participate in the ETS in or-
der to purchase and withdraw permits from the market. Retiring permits
decreases the available supply of permits and by the economic principles (of
supply and demand) this action drives prices of permits up.13 Then, the ra-
tional rmsstrategy is to use a tool which can provide higher independency
from the permits. Therefore, the strategy of the withdrawn permits, could
induce rms to select a greener-technology which reduces the productivitys
negative externalities (by-product result). However, a necessary condition
for the environmentalistsparticipation (as well as for the third partiespar-
ticipation) is the existence of available permits in the market or quantity of
permits more than the optimum. Hence, this participation could be a signal
for the regulator that he/she allocated a number of permits greater than the
optimum but the third partiesparticipation could drive the market to the
optimum point or closer to this.
4 Environmental groups and overallocated per-
mits
As discussed in the previous section, the environmental groups purchase and
withdrawn permits in order to reduce the quantity of the markets available
permits. Therefore, due to the law of demand and supply the price of the
13For a diagrammatic approach see Israel (2007) and Smith and Yates (2003b).
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permits is increasing.14 Besides, the environmentalists will purchase permits
if the market is over the equilibrium point where someone is willing to sell
permits (the seller) and someone else is willing to purchase permits (buyer).15
Therefore, the question is; if they could purchase the extra quantity of per-
mits. Thus, in order to explore this issue it is important to know the number
of the overallocated permits as well as the price of the permits. For these
reasons we use the available information from the application of the tradable
permitsmarket from 2005 until 2007 (pilot phase).
During the rst period of the emission permits system in the European
Union (pilot phase 2005-2007) a number of permits allocated to the rms
by the regulator. However, the allocated permits exceeded the real level of
the emission, or simply the level of the veried emissions was less than the
quantity of the allocated permits for all the years of the pilot phase. We
adopted the data from Anderson and Di Maria (2011) and it is obvious the
overallocation of permits during the phase 1. The data are presented in the
next table
Table 1: Tonnes of overallocated permits/emissions in the EU 25.
14For a diagrammatic analysis see Israel (2007) and Smith and Yates (2003b).
15We focus on a short term (e.g. one year) where the seller or the buyer will not adopt
a di¤erent technology and will not change the level of their production.
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Year allocated permits/ veried overallocated permits/
CO2 emissions emissions CO2 emissions
2005 2,096,444,000 2,014,017,000 82,427,000
2006 2,071,740,000 2,035,612,000 36,126,000
2007 2,078,703,000 2,051,545,000 27,158,000
Total 6,246,887,000 6,101,174,000 145,713,000
Source: Anderson and Di Maria (2011).
In table 1 we present the allocation of the permits for the pilot phase (or
phase 1) in E.U where one permit represents "the right to pollute" one tonne
of CO2. In the rst year of the phase1 (2005) the quantity of the overallocated
permits was equal to 82,427,000 tonnes of CO2 but the last year (2007) the
quantity of the exceeded permits was 27,158,000 tonnes of CO2. Then, as
expected the overallocation of the permits with respect to the real emissions
had an inuence for the determination of the permitsprice. Particularly,
the excess supply of the permits had a negative e¤ect on the permitsprice
given that the supply was higher than the demand in the European market.
So, the next step is to focus on the price of the permit during the phase
1. The permits price behavior during the period 2005-2007 is presented
diagrammatically in gure 1 below. As we can observe in gure 1, during
the year 2007 the price of the permits reduced and it was much lower than
the previous two years, 2005 and 2006. Specically, in the beginning of 2007,
January, the price of the permit was equal to 4 e but during all this year
the price was reducing and in the end of the year the price was approaching
21
zero (e0.03 in December, 2007)1617
Figure 1: Prices of CO2 European permits.
Source: Hintermann, B. (2010)
Therefore, we know that the regulator allocated a quantity of permits
much higher than the optimum or that the regulator had a lack of knowledge
for the optimum number of permits/emissions. Also we know that in the Eu-
ropean emissions permitsmarket the third parties are allowed to participate
and the environmental groups are participating (see for example the ENGO
Sandbag). Hence we return back to the question; whether the environmental
16See also the report 2008 from the pointcarbon under the title: Carbon 2008: Post-2012
is now. (Source: http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/resources/analysis/1.912721)
17It is interesting to note that from the year 2013 and after some coun-
tries (like UK) will adopt or thinking to adopt a regulation for the minimum
price of the permits, a carbon price oor. See for example http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consult_carbon_price_support.htm
Also, for the price oor see Wood and Jotzo (2011).
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groups have the budget to purchase and withdraw permits in order to drive
the market to the optimum point. In other words, can they purchase the
excess quantity of permits? If yes then, can it be a protection valve for the
function of the system? Also, could they o¤er more safety to the regulator
if he overallocated permits?
In order to explore the previous issues we collected information from
di¤erent ENGOs with respect to their annual income. Particularly, in the
next table (table 2) are presented some environmental groups which were
active in the countries of the European Union and their available income for
the year 2007 is published and is available to the public. In order to decide
which environmental groups are appropriate for our research we followed
some criteria. Specically, we choose the ENGOs according to the following
criteria:
a) They have available data for the level of their income at least for one
year of the period 2005-2007
b) They are funded by the European Commission18
c) They are relatively known or famous European ENGOs
However, it is important to note that the presented incomes are not avail-
able for all the European environmental groups and therefore we collected
some data directly from the environmental groupswebsites and some other
data indirectly through the guidestar.uk website which provides information
18Under the European project LIFE the European Commission provides operating funds
to ENGOs (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ngos/list_ngos97_07.htm).
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for the non-governmental organisations. Unfortunately, there are not enough
available data before the year 2007 and in some cases the incomes that we in-
clude in the table are only for the British part of some environmental groups
such as for example WWF-UK.19 Also, is essential to note for the reader that
there are more ENGOs which could participate in the EU permitsmarket
and here we present only some of these ENGOs.
Table 2: ENGOsincome for the year 2007
Environmental Income in National Income in
Groups Currency 2007 Euros 2007
Birdlife International1 9,562,392 £ 11,952,990 e3
Friends of the Earth 1 6,521,039 £ 8,151,298 e3
Greenpeace (environmental trust-UK)1 2,942,826 £ 3,678,532 e3
WWF-UK1 45,404,000 £ 56,755,000 e3
CEE Bankwatch Network2 1,393,093 e 1,393,093 e
European Environmental Bureau2 2,229,222 e 2,229,222 e
Women in Europe
for a Common Future2 2,394,688 e 2,394,688 e
Environmental Partnership
for Sustainable Development2 5,256,037 e 5,256,037 e
Total 91,810,860 e
19It is essential to note that we focus on the European or British parts of the EN-
GOs and not on the global level. For example the year 2007 Greenpeace International
had 212,316,000 e and WWF International had 133,601,000 $ and WWF Network had
633,193,000 $. So, at global level the ENGOs have larger available income.
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Source: 1guidestar uk, 2available from the site of the analogous
ENGOs, 3according to ameco for the year 2007, 1 e = 0.8 £
In the rst column of the table there are the environmental groups where
their available income in national currency (pounds or euros) is presented in
column two. In order to use the same currency with the permitsprice we
calculated the incomes according to the average exchange rate of the year
2007 following the information from European union ameco.20 The results
are included in the last column.
As we can observe, the higher income for the year 2007 had the WWF-
UK with 56,755,000 e and the Birdlife International with 11,952,990 e. In
addition, the lower income for the same year had the CEE Bankwatch Net-
work with 1,393,093 e. However, the total annual income only from these 8
ENGOs is equal to 91,810,860 e.
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection a sensitivity analysis is used in order to check if the environ-
mental groups have the level of the necessary budget (annual income) in order
to purchase the exceeded permits of the year 2007. In other words, we ex-
amine this hypothesis which supports that the third parties -and specically
the environmental groups- could drive the permitsmarket to the optimum
20AMECO is the annual macro-economic database of the European Commissions Di-
rectorate General for Economic and Financial A¤airs (DG ECFIN).
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equilibrium if the regulator allocated permits more than the optimum. The
results are included in the table 3 where we present the annual spectrum
of the permits price for the year 2007, starting from the minimum price of
the 0,03 e/permit until the maximum price for the same year equal to 4
e/permit.
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis
e/permit CO2 overallocated Total cost for ENGOs Total
permits Overallocated permits Income 2007
0,03 27158000 814,740 e 91,810,860 e
0,5 27158000 13,579,000 e 91,810,860 e
1 27158000 27,158,000 e 91,810,860 e
1,5 27158000 40,737,000 e 91,810,860 e
2 27158000 54,316,000 e 91,810,860 e
2,5 27158000 67,895,000 e 91,810,860 e
3 27158000 81,474,000 e 91,810,860 e
3,38 27158000 91,794,040 e 91,810,860 e
3,5 27158000 95,053,000 e 91,810,860 e
4 27158000 108,632,000 e 91,810,860 e
As we observe the aggregate income from the 8 ENGOs, is enough in
order to purchase the excess quantity of permits (over the optimum) if the
price of the permits will not exceed the 3,38 e. Of course we assume that
the ENGOs will use all their income in order to purchase the extra permits.
Therefore, they will not have expenditures for other ecological economics.
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However, we include only some of the environmental groups which are acti-
vated in the European Area but not all of them because the available data
are restricted. Furthermore, it is essential for the regulator that the ENGOs
have the purchasing power to drive the market to an interior equilibrium
and this could be an additional support for the policy-maker and the en-
vironmental policy generally given that the regulator could be more safe
under the possibility of asymmetric information and the threat of a possible
overallocation of permitsquantity in the future.
Unfortunately, the available information are not enough in order to focus
on the previous years (2005 and 2006) of phase 1 although there are more
environmental groups which may participate (or they have the dynamic to
participate) In addition, the two large environmental groups Greenpeace
and WWF at global level they have a big amount of available income (see
footnote 19) which could be enough in order to purchase and withdraw a
large quantity of European permits given of course that they will use all
their available budget for the specic reason.
Besides, we tried to present some results form the rst period -rst phase-
which was a pilot period for the European ETS. We believe that the second
period- phase (2008-2012)- could give more interesting elements and data
with respect to the environmental groupsparticipation in the EU ETS.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the third partiesparticipation in the Emis-
sion Trading System and specically the potential role of the environmental
groups for the determination of the equilibrium in the permitsmarket. Fol-
lowing the literature and the experience from the rst phase of tradable per-
mitsapplication in the EU ETS we examine if and how the environmental
groups or Environmental Non Governmental Organisations (ENGO) could
purchase and withdraw permits for the European market. Specically, the
motivation for this paper emanates from the problem of the overallocation
permits during the phase 1 (2005-2007) were the regulator allocated a num-
ber of permits to the rms more than the optimum quantity. Obviously, this
was an essential reason why the price of the permits was very low especially
during the year 2007. Hence, the environmentalistsparticipation in order to
purchase the extra permits may be a way for the market and for the regulator
to achieve an e¢ cient outcome.
We use the available data from the rst phase of the European permits
system and the analogous income for some of the European environmental
groups. The available data restricted the analysis to the year 2007 and
although we focused on a small number of ENGOs, we show that they have
the purchasing power in order to withdrawn the quantity of the overallocated
permits. For the ENGOs their participation in the ETS could be a new tool in
order to press the rms to adopt a better and less polluting technology which
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could drive to a lower level of emissions. For the regulator, their participation
could be a signal that he had allocated more permits than the optimum but
also the ENGOs could help the market to reach the optimum equilibrium,
so, their participation may be a helpful instrument for the e¢ ciency of the
ETS and the environmental policy.
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